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Abstract. Oblivious RAM (ORAM) is a provable technique to protect a user’s
access pattern to outsourced data. Recently, many ORAM constructions have
been proposed, but most of them are impractical due to high communication and
user-side storage costs. Motivated by Partition ORAM (P-ORAM) [16], a state-
of-the-art communication-efficient ORAM construction, this paper proposes GP-
ORAM (Generalized Partition ORAM) as a new framework to assemble multiple
ORAM partitions together while overcoming the limitations of the P-ORAM con-
struction. GP-ORAM allows smaller and adjustable number of partitions, fully
utilizes the available user-side storage to reduce communication cost, and can ef-
ficiently export the index table to the server. As a result, GP-ORAM incurs low
bandwidth cost (i.e., O(logN) data blocks per query in practice) and has signifi-
cantly less user-side storage cost than P-ORAM.We demonstrate the security and
practicality of GP-ORAM through extensive performance analysis.
1 Introduction
Oblivious RAM (ORAM) [4], which was originally proposed by Goldreich and Ostro-
vsky, has been a provable approach to preserving a user’s access pattern to data out-
sourced to a remote storage server. The past decades have witnessed numerous ORAM
constructions [3, 5–9, 12–16, 18, 19] developed for various purposes. Although many
neat asymptotical results have been reported, the practicality of these constructions is
still not satisfactory. Particularly, the designs either demand for large user-side storage
or incur high communication cost.
Partition ORAM (P-ORAM) [16] is one recent effort in developing practical ORAMs.
The P-ORAM construction was designed to achieve a low and thus practically accept-
able communication cost. Specifically, the server-side storage of P-ORAM is organized
as
p
N partitions, assuming N is the number of exported data blocks, and each parti-
tion is an ORAM. The user-side storage includes an index table recording the location
of each block, a shuffling buffer that can store and shuffle all data blocks of any ORAM
partition, and
p
N stash slots. With such a storage arrangement, it has been shown that
the communication cost for data query and shuffling is as low as logN data blocks per
query. Compared to other state-of-the-art ORAM constructions [10, 17, 20], P-ORAM
achieves higher communication efficiency.
However, P-ORAM design has its limitations. First of all, it requires a large and
fixed local storage to store the index table and facilitate shuffling. For example, when
N = 232 and block size is 64 KB, 31 GB local storage is needed. Second, the index
table cannot be efficiently exported to the server. According to our evaluation, if the
index structure is exported to the server, in order to query just a single block, more than
1000 data blocks on average have to be retrieved. In addition, the user’s accesses to data
blocks have to be entirely sequential in order to compress the index table.
To address the above limitations of P-ORAM, while inheriting its nice feature of
low communication cost, this paper proposes a generalized version of P-ORAM, called
GP-ORAM. There are a few key improvements of GP-ORAM over P-ORAM. First, the
number of partitions is adjustable in GP-ORAM. This way, even with a smaller local
storage than what P-ORAM requires, GP-ORAM may still achieve a low communi-
cation overhead via properly adjusting the number of partitions. Second, each ORAM
partition in GP-ORAM is redesigned (different from that in P-ORAM) to enable effi-
cient query and shuffling. Finally, the index structure in GP-ORAM is also redesigned
to enable efficient exportation of it and accommodate the above changes.
Rigorous security analysis has been conducted to prove that the proposed GP-
ORAM construction can preserve a user’s access pattern and the construction fails with
only a probability of O(N  log logN ). Extensive cost analysis has also been conducted
to show that GP-ORAM is a more practical construction than P-ORAM. Particularly,
the local storage demanded by the recursive version of our proposed GP-ORAM scheme
is only 2.5%0.14% of that by the non-recursive version of the P-ORAM scheme (note:
as shown in Section 6, the recursive version of the P-ORAM scheme is impractical due
to its extremely high communication cost, and therefore is not considered), while GP-
ORAM only yields 1 to 3 times higher communication cost than P-ORAM.
In the rest of the paper, Section 2 formalizes the problem. Section 3 describes the
intuitions behind the proposed GP-ORAM design, and Section 4 elaborates the details
of the GP-ORAM construction. Sections 5 and 6 present the security and cost analyses
of GP-ORAM, respectively. Section 7 briefly reviews the existing ORAM constructions.
Finally, Section 8 concludes the work.
2 Problem Statement
We consider a system composed of a user and a remote storage server. The user exports
a large set of data to the server, and wishes to access these data without exposing the
access pattern to the storage server. Data is assumed to be stored and accessed in the
unit of block, and typically a block is no less than 64 KB [16]. Let N and B denote the
total number of blocks exported and the size of a block (in bits), respectively.
Server and user may have different storage capabilities. The cloud server could hold
terabytes to petabytes of data in its storage cluster. The user may use thin devices such
as tablets and smartphones, and thus may have only gigabytes of RAM and local storage
available. Moreover, in practice, bandwidth is usually more expensive than computation
and storage. Thus, we aim to design an ORAM scheme that can utilize the given user-
side storage efficiently so that the bandwidth cost can be minimized.
In an ORAM system, each data request from the user, which the user wishes to
keep private, can be one of the following types: (1) read a data blockDi of unique ID i
from the storage, denoted as a 3-tuple (read; i;Di); (2) write/modify a data block Di
of unique ID i to the storage, denoted as a 3-tuple (write; i;Di). To accomplish a data
request, the user may need to access the remote storage multiple times. Each access to
the remote storage, which is observable by the server, can be one of the following types:
(1) retrieve (read) a data block Di from a location loc at the remote storage, denoted
as (read; loc;Di); (2) upload (write) a data block Di to a location loc at the remote
storage, denoted as (write; loc;Di).
Security Definition We assume that the server is honest but curious. That is, it behaves
faithfully according to the ORAM design to store data and serve users’ read or write
requests, but it may attempt to figure out the user’s data access pattern. The network
connection between the user and the server is assumed to be secure; in practice, this can
be achieved using well-known techniques such as SSL [2].
We inherit the standard security definition of ORAM in [16] to define the security
of our proposed ORAM. Intuitively, an ORAM system is considered secure if the server
learns nothing about user’s access pattern. More precisely, it is defined as follows:
Definition 1. Let x = h (op1; i1; D1), (op2; i2; D2),    i denote a private sequence
of user’s intended data requests, where each op is either a read or write operation,
and A(x) = h (op01; loc1; D01), (op02; loc2; D02),    i denote the sequence of user’s
accesses to the remote storage (observable by the server) to accomplish the intended
data requests. An ORAM system is said to be secure if (i) for any two equal-length
private sequences x and y of intended data requests, their corresponding observable
access sequences A(x) and A(y) are computationally indistinguishable; and (ii) the
probability that the ORAM system fails to operate is small, i.e., O(N  log logN ).
3 Intuition
As GP-ORAM is generalized from P-ORAM, we first review the key ideas and lim-
itations of P-ORAM. As shown in Figure 1, the server-side storage of P-ORAM is
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Fig. 1. P-ORAM Storage Organization.
organized as
p
N ORAM partitions, while the user-side storage includes an index table
recording the location (i.e., partition ID, layer number and layer offset) of each block, a
shuffling buffer that can store and shuffle O(
p
N) data blocks and
p
N stash slots each
corresponding to one partition. To query one data block, it needs to retrieve one data
block from each layer of an ORAM partition on the server, which results in O(logN)
data blocks of communication cost, and the query target block is relocated to a ran-
domly selected stash slot. Each query is followed by a background eviction, in which
some data blocks are evicted from stash slots into their corresponding ORAM parti-
tions; the evictions cause the ORAM partitions to be gradually reshuffled, and shuffling
causes O(logN) data blocks of communication cost per query, on average. To summa-
rize, as bandwidth is usually more expensive than storage, P-ORAM was designed to
achieve a low communication overhead at the cost of increased local storage.
However, P-ORAM has the following limitations. First, P-ORAM requires a large
local storage (O(
p
NB) bits), due to
p
N stash slots and a shuffling buffer with a capac-
ity of O(
p
N) blocks. This limits P-ORAM’s practical applicability as it is impossible
to implement P-ORAM if the user has less local storage than required. Second, the in-
dex table cannot be efficiently outsourced to the server. Each entry of the table has three
fields: partition ID, layer number, and layer offset. The layer number and layer offset
need to be updated during both query and shuffling processes. If the index table is out-
sourced to the server, the query and shuffling processes need to frequently query and
update the index table, which leads to impractically high communication cost. Third,
the user’s data accesses have to be entirely sequential in order to compress the index
table.
Motivated by P-ORAM and also to overcome its limitations, we present GP-ORAM
as a new framework to assemble multiple ORAM partitions together. It has the follow-
ing key ideas. First, the number of partitions is not fixed so that the user can adjust the
number of partitions according to the available local storage. Second, the index table is
re-designed so that it can be outsourced to the server efficiently. Third, to make full use
the available local storage, each ORAM partition is based on a revised S-ORAM [20]
construction. As a result, GP-ORAM inherits the security property and the communica-
tion efficiency of P-ORAMwhile being able to work with and fully utilize a wide range
of available local storage.
4 The Proposed GP-ORAM Construction
We elaborate the design of GP-ORAM in terms of storage organization, system initial-
ization, query process, and background eviction process. To simplify the presentation,
we assume the user stores index entries of all outsourced data blocks locally. In practice,
to save the user’s local storage, the index entries can be recursively exported to the stor-
age server, following the same ideas used in tree ORAM [14] and Path-ORAM [17].
Detailed description of the recursive version of the GP-ORAM construction can be
found in Appendix I
4.1 Storage Organization
GP-ORAM stores both real blocks (i.e., user’s N actual data blocks outsourced to the
server) and dummy blocks (i.e., faked data blocks with random padding). When a block
is in plain-text, it can be split into pieces and the size of each piece is b = logN bits.
For each real block, the block ID i is contained in its first piece, denoted as di;1, while
the first piece of each dummy block is set to 1. The remaining pieces store the content
of that block, denoted as di;2, di;3,    , di; 1.
Before being exported to the remote storage server, the plain-text block is encrypted
using CTR encryption mode (counter encryption mode) [11] piece by piece with a se-
cret key k. Specifically, the ciphertext of each block Di contains  pieces, denoted as
ci;0;    ; ci; 1, where
ci;0 = Ek(ctr), where ctr is a nounce generated by a pseudo-random function;
ci;1 = Ek(ctr + 1) di;1;
   ;
ci; 1 = Ek(ctr +    1) di; 1:
(1)
Thus, the encrypted block (denoted as Di) is Di = (ci;0; ci;1; ci;2;    ; ci; 1).
Server Storage The server-side storage is divided into P smaller fully-functional
ORAM partitions, where P is a system parameter. Each partition can hold 1:1N=P real
blocks. As shown in Lemma 1 (Section 5), given that logN log logN  P  pN , the
number of real blocks in each partition is upper bounded by 1:1N=P with a probability
of 1 O(N  log logN ).
In GP-ORAM, each ORAM partition is a revised version of the S-ORAM [20]
construction. Specifically, each partition is organized as a pyramidical structure shown
in Figure 2, where the total number of layers is denoted as L2 = dlog(N=P )e. The
top layer, i.e., layer 1, is an array containing up to four blocks. Each of the rest layers
is organized as one or multiple segments. These layers are further divided into single-
segment layers (i.e., T1-layers, including layers 2 to L1 = blog(3 log2N)c   1) and
multi-segment layers (i.e., T2-layers, including layers L1 + 1 to L2).
Each T1-layer l has a single segment. The segment stores 2l+1 blocks, at most half
of which are real blocks, and one encrypted index block Il with 2l+1 entries. Each entry
of Il corresponds to a block in the segment and consists of three fields: ID of the block,
location of the block in the segment, and access bit indicating whether the block has
been accessed since it was placed to the segment.
For each T2-layer l < L2, it is composed ofWl = d2l= log2Ne segments, while the
bottom layer (i.e., layer L2) containsWL2 = d1:12L2= log2Ne segments. The bottom
layer has slightly more segments, because it should be able to accommodate 1:1N=P
real data blocks. A T2-layer segment has the same format as a T1-layer segment except
that it needs to contain exactly 3 log2N data blocks. Having 3 log2N data blocks per
segment is to ensure the security property of the design and it has been proved in [20].
Inside each segment, there is an index block with at most 3 log2N entries and each
entry contains three fields: ID of the block (needing logN bits), location of the block in
the segment (needing log(3 log2(1:1N=P )) bits), and access bit (needing 1 bit). Thus,
an index block needs at most 3 log2N [logN +log(3 log2(1:1N=P ))+1] bits. In prac-
tice, with N  232 which is considered large enough to accommodate most practical
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Fig. 2. Organization of the server-side storage.
applications, the size of an index block is less than 32 KB, which can fit into a typical
block assumed in P-ORAM [16].
In addition, each ORAM partition p maintains a counter Cp to keep track of the
times that the partition has been queried.
User Storage The user-side storage consists of the following components. (i) Stash
with P slots: each stash slot corresponds to one of the ORAM partitions; that is, it
buffers the blocks that should be written to the corresponding partition later. (ii) Shuf-
fling buffer: the shuffling buffer (with the capacity of S blocks) is used for data shuf-
fling process. (iii) Index table: the index table records the information of each block.
Specifically, it has N entries and each entry (pi; li) has two fields; the block is in parti-
tion pi and the block is latest stored on layer li. (iv) Secret storage: it stores all secrets
including cryptographic keys for encryption and authentication, and its size is negligible
compared to the other components.
4.2 System Initialization
To initialize, the user first selects a data encryption key, denoted as k. Then, each real
block is encrypted and randomly assigned to one of the P partitions; the local index
table is initialized to reflect the assignment.
After the above assignment, the user initializes each partition pi as follows. For each
of the real blocksDj assigned to partition pi, the user selects a secure hash function, de-
noted asHpi;L2(), for the bottom layer L2, and assignDj to segmentHpi;L2(j). Then,
the user adds dummies to ensure each segment contains exactly 3 log2N blocks. For
each segment, the user randomly permutes all blocks inside it and builds an encrypted
index block for it. Finally, the index and data blocks are uploaded to the server.
4.3 Data Query
To query a data block Dt, the user first searches the index table to get partition ID pt
and layer number lt for Dt. Then, the user searches the stash slot of pt. If Dt is not
found, the user will launch a query forDt in partition pt; otherwise, a dummy query to
pt will be launched.
Algorithm 1 Query(Dt; pt)
1: L  the set of non-empty layers of partition pt
2: Retrieve Cp from partition pt
3: if (Dt is a dummy block) then
4: S  fseglj8 l 2 L; segl is a randomly-selected segment of layer lg
5: Retrieve the index block of each segment in S
6: From each segment in S, retrieve a dummy block that has not been accessed
7: Update, re-encrypt & upload the retrieved index block
8: else
9: Find layer l^t whereDt is located; segl^t  Hpt;l^t(t)
10: //Secure hash function Hpt;l^t(t) decides which segment of layer l^t in partition pt
storesDt
11: S  fseglj8 l 2 L n fl^tg; segl is a randomly-selected segment of layer lg
12: Retrieve the index blocks of segments in S [ fsegl^tg
13: From each segment s 2 S [ fsegl^tg, retrieve a dummy block that has not been accessed
if s 2 S, orDt otherwise
14: Update, re-encrypt & upload the retrieved index block
15: end if
The algorithm for querying Dt in partition pt, i.e., Query(Dt; pt), is revised from
the query algorithm in S-ORAM [20] and formally presented in Algorithm 1. In the
algorithm, the layer l^t whereDt is located is found as follows: First, based on the query
counter Cpt , the most recently shuffled layer l
0 can be inferred. Then, l^t  l0 if l0  lt
because Dt must have been shuffled to l0 during the most recent shuffling process;
otherwise, l^t  lt.
4.4 Background Eviction
After each data query, a background eviction process as described in Algorithm 2 should
be launched to avoid stash overflowing. Similar to P-ORAM, this process could be
sequential or random. For simplicity, we adopt the sequential approach. Suppose  
records the last evicted stash slot and  denotes the eviction rate (i.e., the number of
stash slots that should be evicted after each data query). The eviction operation essen-
tially pushes one data block from its stash slot to layer 1 of its corresponding partition.
As the capacity of layer 1 is limited, every four eviction operations performed on a par-
tition could result in layer 1 overflow and thus should trigger a data shuffling of that
partition.
Different from P-ORAM, GP-ORAM shuffles data in pieces instead of blocks, as
in S-ORAM [20]. To shuffle a certain x number of blocks in the unit of piece, only
Algorithm 2 Sequential Background Eviction ()
1: for k = 1 to  do
2:   ( + 1) mod P
3: if (stash slot[ ] does not contain real block) then write a dummy to layer 1 of p 
4: elseremove a real block from stash slot[ ] and write it to layer 1 of p 
5: end if
6: Cp  Cp + 1
7: if (Cp mod 4 = 0) then
8: Shuffle partition p 
9: end if
10: end for
bx bits of local storage is needed, while Bx bits of local storage would be needed if
shuffling these blocks in the unit of block. Hence, GP-ORAM can utilize the shuffling
buffer more efficiently than P-ORAM. To facilitate fine-grained shuffling, the shuffling
buffer is split into the following two components (as shown in Figure 2): (i) , which
is a buffer to store a permutation of up to 2m2 inputs and thus needs 2m2 log(2m2)
bits, wherem is a system parameter; (ii) buf0, which is used to temporarily store up to
2m2 data pieces. Recall that each data piece has b bits and the capacity of the shuffling
buffer is S bits. In GP-ORAM, we set the shuffling buffer size to
S = 4:4  N
P
 (log(4:4  N
P
) + b): (2)
The purpose is to ensure that, for any layer of each partition, each block is downloaded
and uploaded for only once during a shuffling process. The shuffling process is the same
as in S-ORAM [20], and thus is skipped here due to space limitation.
5 Security Analysis
To show that GP-ORAM is secure according to Definition 1 in Section 2, we develop
a proof in two parts: (1) GP-ORAM generates a random access pattern independent of
user’s actual access pattern, and (2) GP-ORAM fails with only a negligible probability.
For the second part, there are three aspects to be proved in detail: (i) the stash over-
flows with a negligible probability of O(N  log logN ), (ii) any partition overflows with
a negligible probability ofO(N  log logN ), and (iii) any layer of any partition overflows
during data shuffling with a negligible probability of O(N  logN ).
Lemma 1. Given that P  logN log logN , the total number of real blocks in the stash
at any time during data queries is upper bounded by 2P (1   2=P ) with a probability
of 1 O(N  log logN ).
Lemma 2. Given that logN log logN  P  pN , the total number of real blocks for
any partition at any time during data queries is upper bounded by  = 1:1N=P with a
probability of 1 O(N  log logN ).
Theorem 1. GP-ORAM is secure under the security definition in Section 2.
Due to space limitation, please refer to Appendices II, III, and IV for the proofs of
the above lemmas and theorem.
6 Cost Analysis
In this section, we analyze the costs of non-recursive and recursive GP-ORAM con-
structions, and compare them to P-ORAM [16], Path-ORAM [17] and S-ORAM [20],
which are the most communication-efficient state-of-the-art ORAM constructions.
Cost Analysis for Non-recursive GP-ORAM The communication cost includes query
and background eviction costs. Each data query retrieves two blocks (i.e., one index
block and one data block) from and uploads only the index block to each non-empty
layer of the server. As there are L2 = dlog(N=P )e layers, query cost on average is:
Cquery < 1:5  log(NP ) B.
As for the background eviction cost, after each query,  blocks are written to 
consecutive partitions at the server. Thus, P= queries result in all P partitions being
accessed once. Therefore, for each partition, layer l (1 < l < L2) is involved in a
shuffling process every 2  2l  P= queries, while layer L2 is shuffled every 2L2  P=
queries. Recall that shuffling a T1-layer l involves 2  2l blocks, shuffling a T2-layer l
involves 4 2l blocks, and shuffling layer L2 involves 5:3 2L2 blocks. Hence, the amor-
tized shuffling cost is Cshuffle = (
PL1
l=2
22lP
22lP= +
PL2 1
l=L1+1
42lP
22lP= +
4:42L2 P
2L2 P= )B,
Therefore, the communication cost for non-recursive GP-ORAM is CGP-ORAM(NR) =
Cquery + Cshuffle = (1:5 + 2) log
N
P B   (log logN   2:8) B.
For storage cost, as stated in Lemmas 1 and 2, the user needs to maintain the fol-
lowing amount of storage space: 2P (1   2P )B + S + N  (logN + log log 1:1NP ),
where P  logN log logN . The size of the stash is 2P (1   2=P )B, the size of the
shuffling buffer is S, and the size of the index table is N  (logN + log log 1:1NP ), re-
spectively. Note that, the shuffling buffer storage is temporary, while the stash and index
table spaces are permanently needed. For server storage, each partition contains at most
5:3N=P blocks. Thus, the server storage is less than 5:3NB.
Cost Analysis for Recursive GP-ORAM Suppose there are  levels of recursion in
the recursive construction, and the ith level of recursion is implemented by GP-ORAMi.
Thus, GP-ORAM1, which is used to store the user’s data blocks, requires a stash of size
2P (1   2=P )B and a shuffling buffer of size S in the user’s local storage, while the
index table is exported to the server as GP-ORAM2. The compression rate for GP-
ORAM2 can be smaller than 2 13 (i.e., the size of GP-ORAM2 can be less than 1213
of that of GP-ORAM1) when N  244 and B  64 KB, which covers the practical
scenarios considered in [16]. Therefore, parameter  is no more than 4; that is, no more
than 4 levels of recursion are needed in practice.
Since GP-ORAM1 has much larger capacity than other GP-ORAMs, the extra com-
munication cost introduced by recursion can be computed asO(
P
i=1 log(
 iN)B) in
practice. For the extra local storage cost, it mainly comes from the stashes for extra GP-
ORAMs (note that the shuffling buffer for GP-ORAM1 can be reused for other smaller
GP-ORAMs), and the total size of these stashes is much less than that for GP-ORAM1.
Specifically, a stash of size 3P (1   2=P )B is enough for recursive constructions. At
last, the extra cost on server storage is O(
P
i=1 
 iN B).
Tradeoff between Local Storage Capacity and Communication Cost in GP-ORAM
Suppose a user exports N data blocks each of B bits, and the local storage capacity is
Sl. The user could find an optimal P (i.e., number of partitions) for GP-ORAM to
minimize the communication cost.
According toCGP-ORAM(NR) in the non-recursive GP-ORAM cost analysis, the larger
is P , the smaller is the communication cost. Hence, the optimal P should be the largest
P without incurring a local storage cost higher than Sl. Formally:
Maximize P;
subject to 2P (1  2
P
)B + S +
NB

 Sl for non-recursive GP-ORAM;
subject to 3P (1  2
P
)B + S  Sl for recursive GP-ORAM:
The example plotted in Figure 3(a) shows the relation between P and local storage
consumption in the recursive GP-ORAM. Recall that, the local storage includes shuf-
fling buffer and stash. As we can see from Figure 3(a), when P is small, local storage
consumption decreases as P increases; when P becomes large, local storage consump-
tion increases as P increases. This phenomenon can be explained as follows.
– When P is small, the size of each partition is large; hence, the shuffling buffer dom-
inates the local storage. As P increases, shuffling buffer decreases which causes the
local storage to decrease as well.
– When P is large, the number of partitions gets large and so the stashes dominates
the local storage. As P increases, the size of stashes increases which causes the
local storage to increase too.
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Fig. 3. Examples illustrating the relation between P , local storage, and minimal communication
cost.
Based on the relation plotted in Figure 3(a), the user can find a range of P , with
which the required local storage does not exceed Sl. Because the communication cost
decreases as P increases, the maximum P within the range becomes the optimal P
that minimizes the communication cost. This way, for any given Sl, the communication
cost corresponding to the optimal P can be found. Figure 3(b) plots an example to
illustrate the relation between local storage capacity and minimal communication cost
in the recursive GP-ORAM.
GP-ORAM VS. P-ORAM Table 1 compares GP-ORAM with P-ORAM in terms
of asymptotical performance. From the table, we have the following observations: (i)
When P is set toN c (c < 0:5) and S is set as in Equation (2), the communication costs
for both non-recursive and recursive GP-ORAM can be re-written as O(logN  B),
which is comparable to the cost for non-recursive P-ORAM and much lower than that
for recursive P-ORAM. (ii) The local storage costs for non-recursive P-ORAM and
GP-ORAM are both O(NB), as the costs are dominated by the index table. The local
storage cost for recursive GP-ORAM is O(PB + S), which is asymptotically smaller
than O(
p
NB) as P <
p
N .
Table 1. Asymptotical Performance Comparison.
Scheme Bandwidth Cost User Storage Server Storage Failure Prob.
P-ORAM (NR) O(logN B) O(NB) < 4NB O( 1
Nc
)
P-ORAM (R) O(log2N B) O(pNB) < 8NB O( 1
Nc
)
GP-ORAM (NR) O( log
3(N=P )
log2 S
B) O(NB) < 5:3NB O(N  log logN )
GP-ORAM (R) O( log
3(N=P )
log2 S
B) O(PB + S) < 5:3NB O(N  log logN )
Figures 4 and 5 compare the performance of GP-ORAM with P-ORAM under the
practical system settings used in [16] (i.e., block size ranging from 64 KB to 1 MB;
the number of blocks ranging from 224 to 232). From the figures, we have the fol-
lowing observations: (i) The local storage demanded by recursive GP-ORAM is only
2.5%0.14% of that by non-recursive P-ORAM, while GP-ORAM only yields about
1 to 3 times higher communication cost than P-ORAM. (ii) Recursive P-ORAM is im-
practical due to its extremely high communication cost.
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Comparing GP-ORAM, Path-ORAM and S-ORAM Table 2 shows the asymptotical
performance comparisons between GP-ORAM, Path-ORAM and S-ORAM. Compared
to S-ORAM and Path-ORAM, GP-ORAM introduces one adjustable system parameter
P , which makes it more tunable.
Table 2. Asymptotical Performance Comparison.
Scheme Bandwidth Cost User Storage Server Storage Failure Prob.
S-ORAM O( log
3 N
log2 S
B) O(S) < 6NB O(N  logN )
Path-ORAM (NR) O(logN B) O(NB) 10NB N !(1)
Path-ORAM (R) O(log2N B) O(logN B)  !(1) > 10NB N !(1)
GP-ORAM (NR) O( log
3(N=P )
log2 S
B) O(NB) < 5:3NB O(N  log logN )
GP-ORAM (R) O( log
3(N=P )
log2 S
B) O(PB + S) < 5:3NB O(N  log logN )
The performance comparison between GP-ORAM and Path-ORAM under practical
scenarios [16] is shown in Table 3. From the table, it can be seen that GP-ORAM can
fully utilize the local storage to achieve better communication efficiency, and it incurs
lower server-side storage cost.
Table 3. Practical Performance Comparison.
Scheme Bandwidth Cost User Storage Server Storage
Path-ORAM (NR) 10 logN B N logN + logN B  !(1) 10NB
Path-ORAM (R) 10 log2N B logN B  !(1) 20NB
GP-ORAM (NR) < 4 logN B N logN + PB + S < 5:3NB
GP-ORAM (R) < 6 logN B PB + S < 5:3NB
Figure 6 shows the performance comparison between GP-ORAM and S-ORAM
under practical scenarios [16]. From the figure, we can see that S-ORAM is not fully
tunable as local storage increases. Especially when the local storage is large enough,
the communication cost cannot be further reduced. For example, when N = 232, B =
64KB and the local storage size has exceeded 1:2 GB, the communication remains the
same regardless of the increase in local storage size, while GP-ORAM can achieve
50%-60% savings in communication cost as the local storage gets larger.
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7 Related Work
According to local storage assumptions, existing ORAM constructions can be roughly
classified into the following categories.
ORAMs withO(1) Local Storage [3–10,12,14]. These ORAMs only have little state
information, such as secret keys and query counters, stored in local storage. Among
them, Balanced ORAM (B-ORAM) [9] proposed by Kushilevitz et. al. incurs the low-
est asymptotical communication cost O( log
2 N
log logN ). In general, these constructions are
impractical as the hidden constants behind the big-O notation are quite large due to the
heavy data shuffling and background eviction processes. Recently, S-ORAM [20] with
constant local storage was proposed to incur O(log2N) communication cost but with
practically small constants behind the big-O notation. It leverages the fact that block
size is usually large and introduced segmentation-based design of query and shuffling.
However, the local storage was not fully utilized as in GP-ORAM.
ORAMs with O(logcN) Local Storage [5, 13, 17, 19]. Among these constructions,
Path-ORAM [17] re-designed the tree structure ORAM [14] and reduced the bucket size
by adding an additional stash to local storage, which resulted in only O(log2N) com-
munication cost. PrivateFS [19] modified and improved a Bloom filter based ORAM so-
lution [18] to approach practicality and concurrency, and resulted inO(log2N log logN)
communication cost. These ORAMs still have high communication costs, needing to
retrieve more than 1000 data blocks per query.
ORAMs with O(N c) Local Storage [4,5,16–18]. The first ORAM with square-root
local storage appeared in [4]. Though the actual communication cost is higher than
p
N
data blocks per query, it is still an inspiring solution that opens the door for subsequent
research. Since then, a novel Bloom filter ORAM [18] was proposed which integrates
a more efficient shuffling method to achieve better performance. ORAMs with O(N c)
(c > 0) local storage were also studied in [5]. Recently, P-ORAM, with sublinear local
storage [16] (square-root local storage in practice) and efficient implementation [17],
has achieved much lower communication cost of O(logN). However, as discussed in
Section 6, the user-side storage cost could be too high to be acceptable, especially when
the number of outsourced data blocks is large.
8 Conclusion
This paper proposed a new ORAM construction, called Generalized Partition ORAM
(GP-ORAM). GP-ORAM utilizes a new shuffling method, adjusts the number of parti-
tions according to the available user-side local storage, and outsources the index table
to the server. Through these techniques, it achieves low bandwidth cost (O(logN)) and
has significantly less user-side storage cost than P-ORAM. We demonstrate the effec-
tiveness of GP-ORAM via extensive security and cost analysis.
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Appendix I: Recursive GP-ORAM
In the construction presented in Section 4, the user needs to maintain an index table
in local storage. To reduce the cost, we can adopt recursive construction to outsource
the index table to the server. Specifically, letting GP-ORAM1 denote the original GP-
ORAM used to store data blocks, a new GP-ORAM2 can be introduce to store the
index table of GP-ORAM2; furthermore, another GP-ORAM called GP-ORM3 may be
introduced to store the index table of GP-ORAM2, and so on and so forth. Suppose one
block in GP-ORAMi+1 can store up to  index entries of GP-ORAMi (1=, therefore,
is the compression rate, which is the ratio of GP-ORAMi+1’s capacity to GP-ORAMi’s
capacity). Then, in each block of GP-ORAMi+1, log(Ni ) bits are needed to represent
a sequence of  blocks in GP-ORAMi and   logPi bits are needed to record the
partitions which these blocks should be stored to, where Pi is the number of partitions
in GP-ORAMi. Therefore, the relation between , N , B and Pi is as Equation (3):
log(
N
i
) +   logPi  B: (3)
With the recursive construction, the local storage can be greatly reduced while the extra
communication cost is insignificant. This is analyzed in detail in Section 6.
Appendix II: Proof of Lemma 1.
The stash capacity can be computed by summing up the number of blocks in all P
slots. Thus, we can focus on the analysis for a single slot. Note that, blocks are loaded
to slots in a uniformly random fashion, and are evicted through the background eviction
procedure with eviction rate  (we use  = 2 in the following analysis).
For any single slot, a real block enters this slot with probability p = 1=P and leaves
with probability q = 2=P . Then, the number of real blocks in any slot is a Discrete
Time Markov Chain (DTMC) starting with state 0 (no blocks in the slot), each state i (i
blocks in the slot) has forward probability pf = p(1   q) to state i + 1 and backward
probability pb = q(1   p) to state i   1. Since  = pf=pb  1=2. The stationary
distribution for each state i is i = i(1   ) (i = 0; 1; 2;    ) and the expectation of
the stationary distribution is =(1  ). Thus, the expected number of real blocks in the
entire stash is
 = P  
1   = P (1 
2
P
): (4)
Now, let’s observe the upper bound on the stash capacity. Suppose Zi denotes the
number of real blocks in slot i (1  i  P ). Then, Zi’s are negatively associated [1]
and Zi’s are geometric random variables with parameter  as mentioned before. Hence,
the upper tail bound for Z =
PP
i=1 Zi [1, 16] is:
Pr[Z  	 ]  e P (	= 1)
2
4 = N 
P
4 lnN = O(N  log logN ); (5)
where 	 = 2 and P  logN log logN . Therefore, given P  logN log logN , the
stash size can be bounded by 	 with overwhelming probability 1 O(N  log logN ).
Appendix III: Proof of Lemma 2.
For every individual partition, we consider the partition together with its corresponding
stash slot as a bin. Thus, the partition capacity can be upper bounded by the bin capacity.
Note that, since the snapshot of any moment for the whole system can be seen as a
particular distribution of randomly throwingN blocks into P bins, the following results
can be deduced on bin capacity:
Consider a particular bin, and define X1;    ; XN as random variables such that
Xi =

1; the ithreal block is mapped to the bin;
0; otherwise: (6)
Note that,X1;    ; XN are independent of each other, and hence for eachXi, Pr[Xi =
1] = 1=P . Let X =
PN
i=1Xi. The expectation of X is
E[X] = E
"
NX
i=1
Xi
#
=
NX
i=1
E[Xi] = N  1
P
=
N
P
: (7)
According to the multiplicative form of Chernoff bound, for any   E[X] = N=P , it
holds that
Pr[a specific bin has more than  real blocks] < e 
N(P=N 1)2
3P : (8)
By applying the union bound, we can obtain
Pr[ 9 any bin with more than  real blocks] < P  e N(P=N 1)
2
3P = O(N  log logN );
(9)
where  = 1:1N=P and logN log logN  P  pN . Note that any partition capacity
is upper bounded by the bin capacity, it holds immediately that any partition capacity is
also upper bounded by  with overwhelming probability 1 O(N  log logN ).
Appendix IV: Proof of Theorem 1.
According to Definition 1, we will first show that, given any two equal-length sequence
x and y of private data requests, their corresponding observable access sequencesA(x)
and A(y) are computationally indistinguishable.
Note that, for the kth access xk = (opk; ik; Dk), the observable sequence A(xk)
consists of two parts: (read; p;D) which is data query; (write; p0;D) which is back-
ground eviction.
– First, for data query, xk (or yk) introduces a read operation on a random partition
px (or py). Then, the background eviction incurs a sequential of write operations on
pre-defined partition p0 for both xk and yk. Hence, A(xk) and A(yk) are computa-
tionally indistinguishable with each other, because their first parts follow a uniform
random distribution and their second parts are the same to each other.
– Second, accesses to individual ORAM partition are oblivious.
 The read operation to a selected partition accesses locations from each non-
empty layer (except layer 1) randomly and non-repeatedly;
 When a data block is evicted to this partition, it is re-encrypted and appended
to the first layer of this partition.
Also, we have proved GP-ORAM fails with a probability of O(N  log logN ) based on
Lemma 1 and Lemma 2. Therefore, it is proved that GP-ORAM construction is secure.
